mentioned in the letter are referred to as Professor) for some advice. The general theme for the 1942 meeting was, fittingly enough, "Civilization in Crisis," and the program committee (which initially had managed not to include a woman in its ranks) hoped to organize a session on women and the great crises of civilization. Pargellis thought that if the right scholars (man or woman) could be found, "we might produce an original and significant session of two or three papers, one on the changing functions of women in the fifth or the sixteenth centuries, and one on the nature of the problem today" (6 Mar. 1942 ). Fowler replied with the names of two scholars: Dr. Pearl Kibre, a medievalist, and Dr. Mary Sumner Benson, an Americanist working on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and (showing herself to be a model of disciplinary rectitude) she suggested that the question of women's status in the present might best be addressed more informally by members of the audience, since little reliable material was available for serious research (18 Mar. 1942 (19 Mar. 1942) Several days later, Fowler wrote back, assuring Pargellis that the scholars she had recommended were quite capable of interpretive approaches and offering to have the Berkshire Conference take over full responsibility for the session (23 Mar. 1942) . He replied that "without committing ourselves in any way," the program committee was willing to let the women historians explore some further possibilities. His letter went on to outline his expectations in a most condescending manner, defining terms ("by sweeping change we mean something more profound and more long range than a war [. . .]") and time periods ("As for the American Revolution, we have come to the conclusion that it is of insufficient significance to stand along with the shift from medievalism to modernity as a period of crisis" [27 Mar. 1942] ). Fowler replied politely that she would take all this up with her colleagues at the forthcoming meeting of the Berks, but there is no correspondence after that (22 Apr. 1942) . In any case, there was no annual meeting in December 1942. It was canceled at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation (the Office of Homeland Security of its day). In its place, the Association published The Quest for Political Unity in World History, a series of papers that had been prepared for the meetings; not surprisingly, given this exchange of letters, the topic of women in history was not among them (see Pargellis) .
I cite this incident for several reasons. First, it allows us a moment of self-congratulation for the role of the Berkshire Conference in making women and women's history integral to the profession and the discipline. We've come a long way in sixty years, at least as far as some feminist goals are concerned. And I think recognizing that fact and acknowledging the role of these early pioneers is a good way to begin this conference. Second (and this is not a reason for celebration), we are once again in a period of grave crisis, on the brink, it sometimes seems, of another world war. Some thirty years of women's history writing-much of it nurtured at this conference, a crucible for the theoretical and substantive debates of feminism-have guaranteed that this time we are in a position to provide critical interpretation. (Stanley Pargellis would long for the days of descriptive women's history if he had the likes of us to contend with!) Feminism has taught us to analyze the operations of difference and the workings of power, and we can extend these analyses to many different arenas. What Wendy Brown has called a feminist analytics of power is one of the lasting results of second wave feminist scholarship. Indeed, one of our early claims-that attention to women and to gender would yield analyses of politics beyond the relationships of women and men-has been borne out repeatedly over the past twenty years (Brown and Scott) . The feminist analytics of power is my subject today. I want to reflect on its insights as they apply to the current crisis, to the history of women and gender, and to the themes of global and local that traverse these seemingly disparate fields.
"Fictitious Unities"
Although the title of this conference-"Local Knowledge ↔ Global Knowledge"-was chosen long before September 11, it poses a good problematic for a time of crisis, even though it carries none of the sense of urgency, anger, and despair that many of us have been feeling over the past months. The arrows between the two spheres (local and global) point in both directions, implying interaction, exchange: two-directional flows of information, population, technology, markets, capital, natural resources, cultural objects, cultural meanings, diseases and their cures. There's room in our analyses of global/local, if not in these iconic representations, for asymmetries of power, for domination and resistance, even for interpenetration and hybridity. What can't be captured by the title and those benign arrows (they are, after all, directional signals not instruments of aggression) are the horrific images of terrorist attacks and relentless warfare we have witnessed lately. The trade towers imploding, suicide bombs exploding, our weapons of mass destruction seeking to locate and destroy terrorists and their weapons of mass destruction, tanks crushing homes with residents still inside, a brutal occupying force wantonly destroying the infrastructure of an aspiring state. The wrenching scenes in newspapers and on television: faces contorted in unspeakable grief; refugees running and screaming or silently fleeing smoke and fire; shattered families mourning their losses; bewildered civilians roaming through ruins, bloodied, homeless, hungry; furious orators railing venomously against outside enemies; flags burning; insignias of hatred scrawled on ruined buildings; bitter accusations and gunshots exchanged across mined borders-Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, New York. The threat of nuclear weapons is no longer containable by Cold War mutual assured destruction pacts, so fears of devastation, once quieted, now return. We ponder uneasily the connections between blood and oil: does the spilling of the one guarantee the flow of the other? The leaders of America-the one and only superpower-flagrantly compromise the rules of law, domestic and international, that they claim it is their mission to protect. The U.S.A. Patriot Act (26 Oct. 2001) eliminates judicial overview of government surveillance and suppression of individuals and organizations; it authorizes searches, seizures, and detentions that might otherwise be unconstitutional. Over the past months we have seen the internment of ethnically marked suspects on the flimsiest of grounds; the creation of military tribunals; the silencing of critical dissent (including the suspension in some universities of professors-usually Arab or, in one case, a translator for an imprisoned Muslim cleric-for expressions of pro-Palestinian opinions); the unilateral abrogation of international treaties; flagrant disregard for such instruments of international law as the Geneva Conventions; and the reckless adoption of cowboy, "go it alone" diplomacy. All is justified in the name of an apocalyptic moral vision, revealed to these born-again cold warriors whose actions seem to be intensifying, not lessening, the possibilities of greater and more dangerous conflicts. Clifford Geertz's apt characterization, "The World in Pieces"-a metaphoric reference to the fracturing of identities and allegiances at local and global levels-now has the force of a literal prediction. "Peace in the world," went our protest song of the 50s, "or the world in pieces." Stanley Pargellis's 1942 report to the aha was entitled The Quest for Political Unity in World History. Some sixty years later such a quest seems naïve at best. And no one now is offering world unity as a way out of the current crisis. Or if they are, it is in stark, binary terms: alliances of good against axes of evil, Western secular rationalism against Islamic religious fundamentalism, modernity against primitive tribalism, reason of state against the forces of terrorism. Lines are being drawn, categories produced, to give schematic coherence to the messy entanglements of local, national, regional, and international politics.
As feminists, we have learned to be wary of such categoriesDenise Riley has dubbed them "fictitious unities"-because even as they offer terms for identification, they create hierarchies and obscure differences that need to be seen (Riley 176) . (Paradoxically, the fact that they are fictitious makes their effects no less real.) "Men" and "women," we now know, are not simple descriptions of biological persons, but representations that secure their meanings through interdependent contrasts: strong / weak, active / passive, reasonable / emotional, public / private, political/domestic, mind/body. One term gains its meaning in relation to the other and also to other binary pairs nearby. Indeed, "the other" is a crucial (negative) factor for any positive identity-and the positive identity stands in superior relation to the negative. Women's supposed lack of reason has historically been not only a justification for denying them education or citizenship; it has also served to depict reason as a function of masculinity. The boundaries of public and private have not reflected the existing roles of men and women, but have instead created them; the imagined map of gender territories has become the referent not only for social organization, but for the very meanings (social, cultural, psychological) of the differences between the sexes. If the meanings of difference are created by contrasting categories, within the categories coherent identities are produced by denying differences. So, while "women" historically has served to consolidate feminist movements, it has also made race, class, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, and nationality somehow secondary, as if these distinctions among us (and the hierarchical positioning that accompanies them) matter less than the physical similarities we share. At least since the 1980s, feminist scholarship has learned (often quite painfully-think of the bitter challenges posed by women of color to the hegemony of white women, by lesbians to mainstream feminism's normative heterosexuality, by Eastern European women to the presumed superiority of Western feminist theory) to make nuanced distinctions along multiple axes of difference; its theories don't assume fixed relationships between entities but treat them as the mutable effects of (temporally, culturally, historically) specific power dynamics. The mantra of "race, class, gender" was a way of thematizing (and so rigidifying and therefore reducing the applicability of ) what is in fact a much more open analytic approach. The premises of this approach are what is important, and it is they that inform necessarily detailed readings of specific situations. If there is something that can be called feminist methodology, it might be summarized by these axiomatic statements: There is neither a self nor a collective identity without an other. There is no inclusiveness without exclusion, no universal without a rejected particular, no neutrality that doesn't privilege an interested point of view, and power is always at issue in the articulation of these relationships. Put in other terms, we might say that all categories do some kind of productive work; the questions are how? and to what effect?
We need this feminist methodology in the current crisis. It should make us pause at the binary divisions of the world into good and evil; at the phantasmatic evocation of a centuries-old crusade to the death by Islam against the West-even when it is offered by reputable scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis. How like those misogynist fantasies of sexually frenzied women turning the world upside down these predictions are: reason threatened by passion and order by disorder; liberal tolerance consumed by rampant fanaticism; enlightenment endangered by the dark forces of sex and superstition; primal conflicts (figured as castration or incorporation) depicted as timeless and as foretelling the end of time. Certainly this way of thinking is the end of history and of politics.
Look at the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, depicted as the encounter between two opposing and equal forces: Jews and (Palestinian) terrorists. Taking advantage of September 11, Ariel Sharon and others have written this very particular Middle Eastern conflict into the larger manichaean script. Official Israeli and American rhetoric takes no account of significant details or the political dynamics of an unequal relationship: the effects of Israeli occupation (which, of late, can only be called a form of state terrorism), of the steady expansion of Jewish settlements in defiance of Oslo and other accords, of the humiliations and deprivations visited daily, over the years, on Palestinians within Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, Israel is depicted as an unwarranted victim of Palestinian rage, drawing on an association of Jews with the Holocaust that is not appropriate in this situation. Yes, there are terrible and inexcusable attacks on Israeli civilians, but the state of Israel is not a victim; it is a mighty military power, an occupying force. Without excusing or condoning suicide bombings, we can read them as weapons of the weak; symptoms of terrible injustices, which include the denial to the Palestinians of the kind of institutional foundations that would enable them to engage in alternative (and more peaceful) forms of politics or even more acceptable forms of warfare. Is it any wonder that those treated brutally reply in kind? That those left outside the law (Palestinians are not equal citizens within Israel, nor have they a state of their own) behave illegally? There are undeniable differences between English suffragists and suicide bombers, and I don't mean to equate them in any way, but wasn't the message of English suffragists who set fires and broke windows in the early 1900s, "don't expect lawful behavior from those who are not allowed to make law"? And isn't there now a response analogous to the one that took feminist violent actions to be proof of women's hysterical nature that treats any protest by Palestinians as inherently terroristic-as if terrorism were an essential trait of Palestinians?
Not only does the good versus evil opposition wipe out the particular conditions of this conflict and mask the vast inequalities between the sides. It also makes it difficult for differences within each side-for the contestations of politics-to be seen or heard. In the Israeli/American depiction of the conflict, all Jews are equated with Sharon's Israel and all Palestinians with Arafat. (And the world is stuck with both of these men as the only possible representatives of their sides.) If you're critical of Israel's policies, you're anti-Semitic; if you think there's a case to be made for Palestine, you're an apologist for terror. In a perverse way, this reductive categorizing has opened new space for expressions of traditional anti-Semitism; Jews as a group have become a target not only for those opposed to Israel's actions, but for racists who have long hated Jews. And it has deprived those who are not anti-Semitic but who are critics of Israel of a voice. Thus in April, a French Jew arrived at a demonstration in Paris organized to protest attacks on synagogues only to discover that it was a pro-Israel rally. Since this man thought Sharon's government had helped provoke the attacks, he couldn't participate, he told a reporter sadly. And there was nowhere else to go. There have been, of course, attempts to challenge these categorizations: many Europeans and their leaders have rejected the simplistic oppositions, calling for a more historicized understanding of the conflict (though they have been bitterly denounced as anti-Semites by Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon); and there are a number of petitions signed by Jews who deliberately invoke their group identity to dissociate themselves from Israel's policies. Still, the overwhelming pressure, here at least, is to deploy the essentialist categories, to homogenize identity, to make difference a matter of moral qualities rather than of politics and history. As feminists, we know that the ruses of essentialism in whatever guises they come ultimately perpetuate inequalities and militate against change. Women need not be the explicit object of debate for us to deploy our analytics of power to useful effect. But when they are, when women become the object of campaigns by the forces of good against the forces of evil, it is important to use our methodologies to read what's going on. The cynical attempt to make the war in Afghanistan and the threatened war against Iraq crusades on behalf of women's emancipation ought not to confuse feminists, and not only because concern for the rights of women was not exactly a priority of the Bush administration before September 11. Rather, what informs our skepticism is our understanding of the ways oppositional categories work to eliminate contradiction and create the illusion of homogeneity (all of us on the good side must believe the same things). The conflation of terrorism and women's oppression erases any problems the good side may face (where there is no terrorism, it follows that there is no oppression of women), and it rallies the support of some potential internal critics (feminists, liberals, human rights advocates). "The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women," Laura Bush told the nation in her radio address last November. "The brutal oppression of women," she said, "is the central goal of the terrorists." Not all Muslims are terrorists, she added, (making a distinction not then or now being observed by the fbi and the U.S. Department of Justice), "only the terrorists and the Taliban forbid education to women. Only the terrorists and the Taliban threaten to pull out women's fingernails for wearing nail polish" (17 Nov. 2001) . (All bases are covered here: equality femi-nists get education, difference feminists, nail polish!) For good measure, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld joined the chorus, attributing Afghan women's newfound freedoms to our "recent military victories against the Taliban." Not only had restrictive dress codes been lifted, he crowed, but the beating of women for the "crime of laughing in public" had ended (qtd. in Rhem). (I find it hard to imagine Afghan women laughing-in public or private-as American bombs rained down on their villages. And I wonder, too, about what fixing on women's laughter in public as a sign of their freedom tells us about Rumsfeld's imagination and about his conception of rights.) I don't mean to imply here that the Taliban treated women well, just that these simplistic equations of good and evil, virtue and terror, us and them don't offer credible diagnoses of or solutions for the problems of Afghan (or for that matter any) women. In addition, they promote a particular vision of women as victims, specifically of "other" women (Third World, Middle Eastern, Islamic) as in need of saving by the West. Inevitably (if we follow our own theoretical insights), this creates a hierarchy that promotes and reinforces a sense not just of Western superiority, but of Western women's superiority-the old colonial relationship emerges intact, an operation of domination in the guise of a mission of salvation. Lila Abu-Lughod warns against the strong appeal of such rescue campaigns: "When you save someone," she reminds us, "you are saving them from something. You are also saving them to something. What violences are entailed in this transformation? And what presumptions are being made about the superiority of what you are saving them to? This is the arrogance that feminists need to question" (788).
The justification of the war in Afghanistan in terms of the salvation of women had a broader resonance; it not only reconfigured a complex geo-political engagement (in which oil pipelines, among other material issues, play no small part) into a simple battle against terrorism; it also used recognizable gender references to articulate power relations between protector and protected. As feminists, we are rightly skeptical of turning our fate over to those who promise protection, who justify their actions (whether aggressive, repressive, or merely taken without consultation) in the name of our security. (Indeed, one of the criticisms of the Taliban was that they justified their treatment of women as "protection.") As Iris Young has argued, the central logic of this kind of protection is masculinist, and it assumes "the subordinate relation of those in the protected position. In return for male protection, the woman concedes critical distance and decision-making autonomy" (unpublished).
Extending the analysis, Young argues that however benign it seems, state sponsored protection denies the role citizens ought to play in democratic societies. The relations established by the logic of protection are multiple and complex: the protector is the U.S. and so American women, too, are positioned as protectors of the rest of the world; but domestically, women along with most of the population are in the feminine position of dependency and subordination to the government of George W. Bush. The administration's point of view becomes the only true one, even if the facts have to be fabricated by a special arm of the Department of Defense (a proposal made and withdrawn, you may remember, in the early days of the war in Afghanistan). One of the premises of feminism over the years has been that equality for women means better and more democracy. "Democracy without women is not democracy," was the slogan of feminists in the European Union in the 1980s and '90s. The validity of this claim seems borne out by Young's analysis of the security regime and its logic of protection. Dependency and subordination are never in the best interests of the protected for they rule out real participation, denying agency and silencing those voices that might have something different to propose.
Reverberations
We need the feminist analysis of categories of identity not only to detect the differentials of power constructed by binary oppositions that are purported to be timeless, natural, and universal, but also to contextualize and historicize these categories. Feminist methodology has taught us to ask about variation, difference, and conflict whenever we are presented with neatly contained entities-and not only "man" and "woman." We ought to assume, based on our methodology even if we are not specialists in the field, that there is neither a uniform Islam nor a single entity called the Middle East. These are politically convenient labels that mask the varieties of states and regimes in the region, as well as of religious movements, including Islamic feminisms that offer new interpretations of the Koran to legitimize claims for changes in women's status. It is these feminisms, strange to our traditions of secular individualism, that Fatima Gailani (a member of the Grand Council that deliberated the political reconstruction of Afghanistan) reminds us need a certain recognition and autonomy. She urges American feminists to press for a foreign policy in the U.S. that will not "save" Afghan women to our values, but create the kinds of conditions that will permit them to participate fully in necessarily heated debates about the future of their own country.
We have learned-sometimes with great difficulty-to acknowledge these very different feminisms, to accept the fact that feminism refers to a multiplicity of often conflicting movements. Global/local, even with those two-way directional arrows, doesn't quite capture it. There may be a recognizable core of meaning, but feminism (like any such concept) needs to be understood as if in translation. Anna Tsing has told us that these are always "faithless translations," since linguistic and cultural differences as well as specific uses affect the meanings of terms (253). Echo may be a better metaphor than translation for designating the mutability of words or concepts because it's more mobile, connoting not just a distorted repetition, but also movement in space and time-history (see Scott) . Perhaps, in these days of cataclysmic transmission, it would be better still to talk about reverberations, seismic shock waves moving out from dispersed epicenters, leaving shifted geological formations in their wake. The word reverberation carries with it a sense both of causes of infinite regression-reverberations are re-echoes, successions of echoes-and of effect-reverberations are also repercussions.
Reverberation occurs to me, I think, because it's the best way to characterize circuits of influence these days. It applies well to the case of France, where I have been following the successful feminist effort (in June 2000) to pass the law on parité, which requires that equal numbers of women and men stand for elective office. The events of September 11 and the Middle East conflict have been a setback for implementation of the parity law in the following way: In the recent French presidential elections, the right-wing nationalist Jean-Marie Le Pen made a strong enough showing to secure a place in the second round of the contest. Le Pen's appeal was anti-immigrant, which in France means anti-Muslim. The mayor of one of the industrial towns that voted heavily for the National Front explained that hostility to Muslim immigrants, who constitute some fifteen to twenty per cent of the local population, had been intensified in recent months. "What happened in New York, Afghanistan, in the Middle East has deepened the religious divide" here, he said (qtd. in Cowell). (France is surely not the only place in which local tensions have been recast in terms of "insecurity" in the face of threats of terrorism-which now includes everything from juvenile crime to movements of resistance within authoritarian states-and whose electoral results-a strong showing of the far right-have had repercussions at home and on the international scene.) In an effort to stave off legislative victories by Le Pen's party, the centrist and left parties in France decided not to implement parity in their selection of candidates for the elections to the National Assembly in June 2002. Since "it's a matter of winning," one party leader commented, the risk of running women is too great. If a temporary setback for French feminists is one of the repercussions of September 11, there are other reverberations of the parité movement itself that continue more positively. Taking up the argument that citizenship means not just voting but holding office, women from Mexico to the UK, from India to the U.S. have been pressing for laws to increase their numbers as representatives. Here is an example of an idea catching on, being adapted as it moves, working differently in different contexts.
Reverberation is a good way to think about this global circulation of feminist strategies, of feminism itself, and also of the analytic term gender. Both terms-gender and feminism-are usually taken to have Anglo-American origins; indeed for some critics they are an example of the one-way trajectory of globalization, whether in the transmission of goods or ideas. Thus feminism has been reviled as one of those commodities "Made in the U.S.A." that corrupts the culture of traditional societies, and gender (of similar provenance) has been taken to constitute a threat to the natural or "God-given" distinctions between the sexes. In fact, neither feminism nor gender are homogeneous even at their points of origin (if such points can be identified); the forms they take and the meanings given them are adapted to local circumstances, which then have international reverberations of their own.
Take the example of gender, a term that emanated from American feminist circles. Even here, though, there was no fixed meaning beyond the idea of "social sex." There were feminists who took sexual difference as a given, the ground on which gender systems were then built; there were others who took sexual difference to be the effect of historically variable discursive practices of "gender." The first approach made much of the sex/gender distinction and focused on "cultural construction"-the assignment of roles, the attribution of traits to sexed individuals-deliberately leaving aside the question of nature. The research undertaken tended to be empirical: histories of exemplary women; recoveries of women writers and artists; statistical demonstrations of occupational and wage discrimination; documentation of the sexism of doctors, priests, educators, and politicians. The second approach rejected the sex/gender, nature/culture dichotomy. "If the immutable character of sex is contested," wrote Judith Butler, "perhaps this construct called 'sex' is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all" (7). Research undertaken from this vantage asked how knowledge of sexual difference was produced and institutionalized, and it was often informed by poststructuralist and/or psychoanalytic theory.
But the clarity of our empiricist/theoretical divide blurred as feminists around the world took up the term gender, sometimes translating it (often with great difficulty), sometimes leaving it untranslated (either way, there were revealing tensions, terrifically interesting subversions that might, for example, turn sex into gender or gender into sex [see Nikolchina, "Translating Gender"]). In Eastern Europe different theoretical uses of "gender" had everything to do with particular political positions. Those looking for ways to counter rightist conservative notions of the natural or God-given facts of biology appropriated theories that deconstructed binary oppositions and emphasized the indeterminacy and variety, as well as the mutability, of differences attributed to biological sex. In contrast, those contending with leftist conservatisms that took equality to mean the obliteration of difference (usually the subsuming of women into the category of "Man") sought ways of making sexual difference, and the social inequalities it engenders, a central tenet of their theorizing and a visible fact of life. For them, statistical documentation was critical if social policy were to address gender inequalities. And it didn't matter that sexual difference (or nature) might be reified in the process, since the point was to demonstrate that sex was now, but should never in the future be, a ground for unequal social treatment. Depending on particular local conditions, feminists in the different countries of post-communism faced different constellations of these conservatisms; depending on their own politics, they combined different theoretical insights to formulate their strategies. These new combinations then echoed across international boundaries, in the forums of the United Nations and elsewhere, to be picked up and readjusted in new circumstances for other strategic reasons.
We can tell similar stories about the reverberations of feminism. I want to tell two. The first is about Julia Kristeva, most often referred to as a "French feminist" (along with Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray). In the debates among U.S. feminists in the 1980s, "French feminism" was equated with poststructuralist theories of language and psychoanalysis and with an emphasis on difference; it was counterposed to a more empirical, social-scientific Anglo-American feminism, which emphasized equality. This contrast, of course, obscured many things, among them the numbers of French scholars and activists committed to social science and equality, and the numbers of Anglo-Americans who embraced poststructuralism. More interestingly, perhaps, it erased a history of cross-fertilization that confounds not only the French/American opposition, but one that came into prominence in the 1990s, that between Eastern European and Western feminism. Julia Kristeva was born and educated in Bulgaria, where she began her career as an interpreter of Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin developed his historicized version of structuralism (a variant of the structuralist semiotics of Iurii Lotman and the structuralism of Roman Jakobson, to name only a few of those working in this field at the time) as a way of challenging Stalinist dogma. Bakhtin's emphasis on formal textual readings was meant to replace the official Soviet crude sociological characterizations of artistic and cultural productions; the suggestion that meanings were shaped dialogically contradicted the communist state's belief that language could be policed, signs controlled (see Engelstein) . Kristeva went to Paris, bringing Bakhtin's notion of polyphony to French structuralist debates in the mid1960s, and she coined the term "intertextuality" to lend (in her words) "dynamism to structuralism" (Dosse 55) . What came to be called French feminism, then, was crucially influenced by philosophical movements opposing communism in the "East" and by a theory that posited not the clash of differences but interaction as the basis for communication.
This history undermines the presumed superiority to "Eastern Europeans" of those "Western" feminists in the 1990s who offered what they called (in the singular) "feminist theory" as the solution to the problems of women in the postcommunist era. The more complicated history of the 1970s is that while some English and American feminists were looking to reconcile Marxism and feminism (in the context of the New Left), "Eastern" feminists in movements of resistance rejected the official theory of communist states by embracing versions of structuralism and then of poststructuralism. As Miglena Nikolchina has shown, there was plenty of theory in the "East" before and after the fall of communism, and some strands of "Western" feminism had already felt its reverberations ("The Seminar"). But the sharp differentiation between "East" and "West" offered in the 1990s more often attributed theory to the West and left the East to fill in the blanks with empirical data. (Western foundations-Soros, Ford-exacerbated the problem by paying only for translations of Western feminist writings into Eastern European languages.) This East/West divide and its accompanying erasure of history-the general intellectual history of the region and the particular histories, both intellectual and political, of the many variants of communism in Poland or Hungary or Yugoslavia-had many repercussions. They ran a spectrum from tensions in the East/West Feminist Network to the far more disturbing actions of Catherine MacKinnon on behalf of raped Croatian women. Lacking knowledge of the intricacies of Yugoslav politics and of the beleaguered multicultural feminist networks operating there, MacKinnon ended up allied with Croatian nationalists, whose concern about raped women stopped at their own borders and did not prevent them from justifying the rapes of Bosnian or Serbian women as legitimate acts of war. MacKinnon's action had repercussions: while she surely drew attention to one aspect of the outrages of ethnic cleansing, she lost the opportunity to offer a critique of the virulent nationalism that fueled it, and she made life more dangerous for those Yugoslav feminists who were trying to offer that critique. These included feminists who, beginning in 1991, have taken to the streets in silent protest week after week. They are known as Women in Black. Theirs is the second story about the reverberations of feminism that I want to tell.
Women in Black was started in Jerusalem in 1988 (at the time of the first Intifada) by women protesting the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. "Once a week at the same hour and in the same location-a major traffic intersection-[a group of women dressed in black] raised a sign in the shape of a hand that said 'Stop the Occupation.' The idea spread quickly and spontaneously to other places in Israel [. . .] ," where Palestinian and Jewish women often stood together, and then to other countries, where solidarity vigils were held in support of the Israeli women's actions ("What is Women in Black?"). "Around 1990," continues the wib web page, "Women in Black vigils took on a life of their own." They were held in many countries and often had nothing to do with the Israeli occupation. In Italy, wib protested the violence of the Mafia; in Germany they stood against neo-Nazi attacks on migrant workers. In India, they called for an end to religious fundamentalists' mistreatment of women. Since 1991 in the former Yugoslavian Belgrade and then Zagreb and other cities, Women in Black have been contesting the ethnic nationalism that engulfed the country in war and that continues to define politics there. As recently as May 2000 in Fiji, Women in Black emerged to protest the overthrow of their democratically elected government (National Council of Women). There are at present at least 123 regular wib demonstrations held all over the world, some in centers of conflict, others in solidarity with vigils elsewhere (World-Wide Women in Black Vigils-Contact Information). Some of the vigils have endured-their members have even held international meetings-others come and go as events seem to require them. Their impact varies, in part depending on their proximity to the violence they protest. It's harder and more dangerous for the Women in Black in Israel and in Serbia or Kosovo, than for their supporters in London or New York (except, of course, when the supporters turn up on site, as some did in Ramallah last winter or when-as in the aftermath of September 11 in San Francisco-the supporters become the object of an fbi investigation because of their pro-Palestinian "international connections" [Kapoor, Kingston] ). The farther away from specific politics supporters get, the more difficult it is to aim at clear political targets-as wib in London discovered when they assembled to protest the nato bombings of Serbia/Kosovo (Cockburn) . The abstract goal of peace was easily deflected to other goals, they learned, and they called off their action when they found themselves standing next to pro-Milosevic, pro-Serbian nationalist demonstrators. But it's clear that as an international movement, wib have attained a certain recognition as a political force. In 2001, a woman from Belgrade and one from Kosovo accepted the United Nations' Millennium Peace Prize for Women on behalf of the international network of wib. And wib was nominated for a Nobel Prize last year by members of the parliaments of Denmark and Norway.
It's hard to imagine awarding these prizes to a phenomenon that is not a discernable organization. For the amazing thing about wib is that it's an improvisational strategy, locally deployed, but not as a branch of any centralized association. Women in Black is (in their words) "a loose network of women world-wide committed to peace with justice and actively opposed to war and other forms of violence," not in the abstract, but in specific situations. They are not an organization, but (again, in their words) "a means of mobilization and a formula for action" ("Women in Black"). The practical means of mobilization are telephone and email lists, chains of affiliation among individuals. The symbolic means is the example that others have offered: paradoxical agency in the face of oppressive power-paradoxical because the mute, nonviolent witness signifies powerlessness while it offers a message of peace as the only rational alternative to catastrophe. The action is the same (all women, all in black, standing silently and peacefully in a public place at a regularly scheduled day and time), but its aim varies depending on the political context the women have chosen to address. The women stand as feminists and they make no claim to be natural-born peacemakers. They do argue that women "are often at the receiving end of gendered violence in both peace and war, and [that] women are the majority of refugees." But it is their feminist analysis (not their feminine nature) that leads them to see "masculine cultures as specially prone to violence" and that gives them "a particular perspective on security" and war ("Women in Black").
wib deploys what I have been calling the feminist analytics of power in concrete (and different) political contexts. Its actions contradict official pronouncements about enemies and friends, refusing to accept (and thus make real) membership in the "fictitious unities" offered by their leaders. Instead, they literally demonstrate the complex realities of politics that acknowledge interconnected histories. So in Israel, wib unites Palestinian and Jewish women in defiance of the idea that they belong to necessarily antagonistic sides. In Belgrade, wib embraced multi-ethnic alliances, reminding their countrymen of the fact that Serbs, Croats and Bosnians had for several generations lived side by side, intermarried, and shared citizenship until nationalist aggression drove them apart. Most recently, last August, the Serbian wib called for an end to armed violence among Albanians, Turks, Serbs, and Macedonians in Macedonia. At the time of the nato bombings in 1998, they were attacked as "Serbia's inner enemies," "quislings" in the service of the U.S., and their demonstrations were banned. Their annual report that year was a "confession of guilt" for seven years of activism in opposition to ethnic homogenization and militarism. I want to read it to you because it is a clear demonstration of applied feminist methodology that is at once familiar to us and distinctive; we hear it as an echo, we feel it as a reverberation. Vukovar, 1991 and Prishtina, 1998 ; that I fed women and children in the refugee camps, schools, churches, and mosques; that I sent packages for women and men in the basements of occupied Sarajevo in 1993 Sarajevo in , 1994 Sarajevo in , and 1995 that Hughes) What is embodied here is not just dissent from the ruling power of the state (a refusal to sanction its actions ceremonially and in practice-"I did not agree," "I was not present"), but active transgression of its boundaries ("I fed women and children in refugee camps," "I sent packages for women and men [. . .] in Sarajevo," "I crossed the walls of Balkan ethno-states"). These are agents of resistance (responsible citizens) who insist that there are (have been, will be again) democratic political alternatives to the regimes under which they have been forced to live.
What is striking about wib, in contrast to many earlier feminist peace movements, is that it does not rest on a claim about the sameness of women or the unity of feminists. Instead, wib's existence as "a means of mobilization and a formula for action" presumes fundamental differences among feminists, differences of context, differences of history, differences of understandings of the feminine and of feminism itself. International gatherings, like the one held in Novi Sad to mark the tenth anniversary of the Serbian vigils, have drawn as many as 250 women from sixteen countries. These meetings provide a chance for the exchange of information and the identification of new targets, but there is no attempt to elaborate a common platform beyond an opposition to militarism and to violence. The recognition of difference is fundamental, even as the form of protest and the name taken to describe the protestors is the same. "Each group is autonomous, each group focuses on the particular problems of personal and state violence in its part of the world" ("Women in Black: An International Movement of Women for Peace"). wib embodies feminism as a situated strategic operation; it is not a question of global/local, but of echoes and reverberations that traverse the world.
The Traces of History
I take Women in Black to be an example of the feminist analytics of power in action, only one of the reverberations of the last twenty years of the theorizing and honing of our methodologies. (And I don't mean to endorse it as the best or most creative form feminist politics can take. I offer it only as a good example of feminist reverberations.) Here is a movement that is not narrowly restricted to things of interest to women, but that takes the domain of large-scale politics as its own. It punctures inflated dreams of national unity, exposes the toxicity of ethnic cleansing, and insists on the possibility of mutual recognition rather than the dissolution of differences. It refuses to accept prevailing arrangements of power as natural or inevitable, insisting that better alternatives be considered. And (to recall the slogan of an earlier era) it "speaks truth to power"; the gesture of silent witness sharply rebukes those who would render us dependents by claiming to rule on "our" behalf.
But in this gesture-all women, all in black, silent and disapproving-there is also an undeniable echo of an earlier history: a feminist politics that rested on the moral infallibility of women who, as mothers, put the interests and care of others above their own. The appeal to "all women of all nations, who suffer childbirth with the same pain" (French feminist Maria Verone qtd. in Bard) launched the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom as World War I began; it informed the many peace movements of first and second wave feminism (Greenham Common among them); and it is still, for some, what makes global sisterhood possible (qtd. in Bard 45). Although Women in Black studiously avoid any call to action or claim to unity on the grounds of maternalism, the echoes of this essentialism in these women-only demonstrations seem audible still. And so they are, a testimony to the fact that reverberations are not only contemporaneous (running horizontally, circling the globe), but historical (running vertically, through time). Feminism is constituted by its methods, its theory, and its history. We carry our pasts into the present, but never entirely. If we have extended the reach of our politics well beyond protests against gender discrimination, we have echoed, but not restated, an old feminist claim that women's interests are society's interests. There is repetition, but not seamless continuity, because the repetition itself makes a difference-is a difference. Perhaps it is precisely an awareness of the inevitability and omnipresence of difference that distinguishes our understanding from that of our predecessors-difference as a fact of human existence, as an instrument of power, as an analytic tool, and as a feature of feminism itself.
Difference, though, must be understood not as sharp contrast, but as a succession of echoes, reverberations. This conference is one of those reverberations. It takes its name and its inspiration from a hardy band of women determined to foster collegiality and intellectual exchange among themselves and to improve their situation within the American Historical Association. Although we can identify with Dorothy Fowler's resistance to Stanley Pargellis, admire her persistence, and (I at least) envy her patience, our feminism is different from hers. We live in a different world: postcolonial, post-cold war, postmodern. It's hard finding a way to detail the differences that separate sixty years of history without resorting to the binary thinking I've been criticizing throughout this talk. Only the distance of time and the myopia that accompanies it lets us describe Fowler's task as simpler than ours, our tools as sharper than hers. That's why reverberations is a better way of thinking about our relation to the feminist history we are here to commemorate and to practice over the next few days. The reverberations of feminism have not usually been earth shattering, but they have created all kinds of disturbances, laterally and longitudinally. We relish these disturbances, because at their best they are intransigent and transgressive, paradoxical and subversive. And they always leave effects in their wake: sometimes visible, sometimes imperceptible, these are realignments and rearrangements that are social, political, and personal. They affect our very being-as women, as citizens, and as situated strategic actors making a difference in our worlds. (Harvard University Press, 1996) . She is writing a book about the French mouvement pour la parité, the successful campaign during the 1990s to pass a law requiring equal numbers of men and women as candidates for elected office.
